Like any other biological trait, communication can be studied from at least four perspectives: mechanistic, ontogenetic, functional, and phylogenetic. In this article, we focus on the following phylogenetic question: how can communication emerge, given that both signal-producing and signal-responding abilities seem to be adaptively neutral until the complementary ability is present in the population? We explore the problem of co-evolution of speakers and hearers with artificial life simulations: a population of artificial neural networks evolving a food call system. The core of the article is devoted to a careful analysis of the complex evolutionary dynamics demonstrated by our simple simulation. Our analyses reveal an important factor, which might solve the phylogenetic problem: the spontaneous production of good (meaningful) signals by speakers because of the need for organisms to categorize their experience in adaptively relevant ways. We discuss our results with respect both to previous simulative work and to the biological literature on the evolution of communication.
underlying a given behavior arise during ontogenetic development or arose during phylogenetic evolution). Nonetheless, as an heuristical rule, it seems appropriate to start studying each type of problem separately, allowing the relationships between them to manifest themselves during this study.
In this article, the behavior that we are dealing with is communication, and the question we focus on is the phylogenetic question. Furthermore, as is true for most, even if by no means all, investigations in the simulation of adaptive behavior and artificial life communities, our approach is quite general and theoretically oriented. In other words, we do not address the evolution of any particular communication system of any given species. On the contrary, we are interested in the general question of how communication (any type of communication) can emerge phylogenetically during the evolutionary history of a species. The rationale for doing this is that communication seems to pose a very general phylogenetic problem, a problem of co-evolution between signallers (speakers) and receivers (hearers).
The emergence of communication, in fact, requires the co-evolution of both good speakers and good hearers. Good speakers are individuals who produce signals that systematically co-vary with situations that are relevant for survival and reproduction. Good hearers are individuals who react to signals in ways that are appropriate to the situations with which signals systematically co-vary. Good speakers without good hearers are useless because signals are not understood and reacted to appropriately. Good hearers without good speakers are meaningless because one cannot react appropriately to signals that do not co-vary with some relevant feature of the world. As Maynard Smith (1997) puts it: "It's no good making a signal unless it is understood, and a signal will not be understood the first time it is made" (p. 208). This simple fact renders the emergence of communication tricky. How can communication evolve if the traits which are necessary for its emergence (i.e., good speaking and good hearing capabilities) taken in isolation are adaptively neutral in that they do not, per se, increase the reproductive chances of the individuals that possess them?
This phylogenetic problem of communication must not be confounded with an adaptive problem, which also stems from the complementarity between speakers and hearers. How can communication systems that do not benefit equally emitters and receivers emerge? Why should speakers send useful signals if they gain no advantage in doing so (as seems to be the case for many alarm and food calls)? Also, why should receivers appropriately respond to signals if they are just being manipulated by signalers to the interests of the latter (as seems to be the case for many aggressive signals or mating displays)? This adaptive problem is clearly related to the co-evolutionary problem in that both depend on the complementarity between signalers and receivers. However, they are clearly different problems: the problem of co-evolution has to do with the phylogenetic question of Tinbergen, while the adaptive problem has to do with the functional question. Furthermore, the phylogenetic problem seems to be more general: while communication poses the adaptive problem only in those communication systems in which the interests of hearers and speakers conflict or at least diverge (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005) , the problem of initiating co-evolution between signalers and receivers is always present.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next two subsections are devoted to a brief review of previous related work in traditional evolutionary biology (Section 1.2) and in the adaptive behavior/artificial life fields (Section 1.3). In Section 2 we describe our model. In Section 3 we show the surprising results of our simulations and propose a possible explanation for them, which represents an interesting solution to the phylogenetic problem. In Section 4 we present a detailed analysis of a single evolutionary run, which makes it possible to fully understand the complex evolutionary dynamics demonstrated by our simple model. This analysis confirms our hypothesis on the phylogenesis of communication, which we further test, in Section 5, by comparing the standard, base-line, simulation with two control simulations. Having reached a full understanding of the forces that are at play in our model, in Section 6 we discuss the relevance of our work with respect to both the adaptive behavior community and to the general (biological) theory on the evolution of communication. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude the article with a summary and some general comments.
Biological View: Receiver Biases in the Emergence of Communication
The recent biological literature on communication has focused mostly on manipulative communication, due to the controversial but deeply influential work of Dawkins and Krebs (1978) . 1 These authors gave a definition of communication that identified it with manipulative behavior: according to Dawkins and Krebs, communication occurs " when an animal, the actor, does something which appears to be the result of selection to influence the sense organs of another animal, the reactor, so that the reactor's behavior changes to the advantage of the actor." This theoretical framework was put forward as a reaction to the general view of communication of early ethologists (e.g., Tinbergen, 1952) according to which the function of communicative signals was to ensure the survival of the group or the species. This species-centered view of natural selection was challenged by the gene-centered view, according to which the basic unit of selection must be the smallest unit of reproduction (i.e., the gene), and any advantage that a trait can produce for the species, the group or even the individual must be understood in terms of the selective advantage of "egoistic genes" (Dawkins, 1976) . Hence, the definition of Dawkins and Krebs: a conception of communication as manipulation was in fact more in line with the new gene-centered view than the old, cooperative conception of early ethologists. The historical importance of the framework of Dawkins and Krebs is probably a result of the fact that it has ever been the only comprehensive theoretical framework on the topic, and one that has produced a number of interesting empirical predictions (Hauser, 1996) . Nonetheless, the identification of communication with manipulation seems to be unjustified both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical point is that the adaptive problem posed by communication is symmetrical: pure adaptive reasoning implies that just as the signaler must have an advantage for sending information, the receiver must have an advantage in order to respond to signals. Empirically, just as there are communication systems in which the result of the communicative interaction seems to benefit only (principally) the signaler (e.g., the aggressive displays produced when competing for some resources or the begging calls produced by newborns for receiving extra feeding from parents), there are also communication systems that seem to provide benefit to both the actors of communication (e.g., mating calls or signals emitted during cooperative endeavors, such as group hunting), and communication systems that seem to benefit only (principally) the receiver (e.g., the food or alarm calls produced by many species). We say "seem to benefit" because we want to stress that the functional, adaptive role of what we consider communicative behavior is something that must be discovered, rather than presupposed. In other words, it is an empirical question who is benefited, and to what extent, by (what we perceive as) a communicative behavior, not something that can be decided a priori, by including it in the definition of communication itself.
While the communication-as-manipulation framework is well suited for dealing with the first type of communication systems, it appears less useful when dealing with cooperative communication, and completely misleading when dealing with communication systems that seem to benefit principally the receiver. Indeed, the definition of communication of Dawkins and Krebs was criticized by several authors (i.e., Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995; VanRhijn & Vodegel, 1980) . However, the reply of Krebs and Dawkins (1984) was to accept some of the criticisms as just little amendments to the basic framework. Their way of framing the problem of the evolution of communication as the evolution of manipulation has been informing most of both the theoretical and empirical biological literature (again, see Hauser, 1996) .
The deep influence of this manipulative view of communication is clear in the standard treatment that biologists have been giving to the phylogenetic problem of communication. In fact, a possible solution to this problem has been suggested in the biological literature through the notion of the exploitation of the receiver (or sensory) bias (Guilford & Dawkins, 1991; Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003) . The basic idea is that in order to manipulate the receiver, the speaker could exploit some behavioral bias of the receiver: if some environmental feature triggers a specific behavior in some organism that has an adaptive value for another one, the latter can produce signals that resemble that environmental feature in order to manipulate the behavior of the former for its own interests. This idea is certainly sound and can probably explain the evolution of several manipulative communication systems. However, it seems much less adequate for explaining the emergence of communication systems that seem to advantage the hearer, such as alarm and food calls that are known to be present in many species, including monkeys, chickens, squirrels, and dogs (for a recent review, see Searcy & Nowicki, 2005) . It seems more reasonable to suppose that this type of communication system could emerge from the opposite mechanism, which we can call the "exploitation of a producer bias." If organisms have some bias to produce behaviors that systematically co-vary with features of the environment which have an adaptive value, those behaviors can be used by other organisms as cues for their own purposes. In this way, the biased behaviors become signals, the organisms that exploit them become hearers, and the individuals that produce them become speakers. However, is the idea of a producer bias reasonable? Where could a producer bias come from? Some recent modeling work (reviewed below) has provided a suggestion: producers might be biased towards good signaling by the need for organisms to internally categorize experiences in adaptive ways. With the work presented in this article, we show that this idea of a producer bias is in fact sound, and might constitute a fundamental way to solve the phylogenetic problem of communication, in both artificial and natural organisms.
Related Modeling Work
The study of the evolution of communication and language through computational models is a very lively field, but most of the research carried out in this area is specifically devoted to language (i.e., Cangelosi, 2001; Hurford, 1989; Kirby, 2002; Parisi, 1997; Steels, 2006 ; for a general overview, see Cangelosi & Parisi, 2002) , which is not the focus of the present article. There are also a number of interesting models that explicitly address the evolution of (animal) communication (for a recent review, see Wagner, Reggia, Uriagereka, & Wilkinson, 2003) . However, most of these models take a functional perspective rather than a phylogenetic one (according to Tinbergen's classification) . In other words, most of the adaptive behavior research on the evolution of communication has been focusing on which are the conditions that can favor the emergence of a communication system, and, in particular, on the adaptive problem described above (i.e., Ackley & Littman, 1994; Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998; Mirolli & Parisi, 2005a; Noble, 1999; Oliphant, 1996) . This is odd, because adaptive behavior/artificial life simulations could give a fundamental contribution, especially to the study of phylogenetic problems. In fact, empirical data on the evolutionary history of species are rather scanty, and necessarily indirect. You simply cannot reload the tape of evolution and directly observe what happened, or what would have happened in different scenarios. However, you can run artificial evolutionary experiments as many times as you want, and by comparing the results of simulations with different set-ups you can test the influence of any kind of factor on the (artificial) evolutionary process. In this way, you can use your virtual experiments to guide speculations, the gathering of empirical data, and the interpretation of the available empirical evidence (Bedau, 1998; Dennett, 1994; Di Paolo, Noble, & Bullock, 2000) .
This notwithstanding, there are only very few models in the adaptive behavior literature that directly deal with the phylogenesis of communication. The first is the seminal work of Werner and Dyer (1992) . In their work, Werner and Dyer evolved communication in a population of artificial organisms that were divided into females and males. Females could see approaching males and emit signals but could not move. However, males could move and hear the signals emitted by females but could not send signals and could not see females. Hence, females had to emit signals in order to guide males to reach for them so that they could mate. The population evolved under what Werner and Dyer called an "XGA," that is, a genetic algorithm in which fitness is not explicitly calculated; rather, organisms reproduce as soon as a male and a female meet. Both recurrent neural networks and look-up tables were used as control mechanisms for artificial organisms, and in both cases the population succeeded in evolving a communication system. From the point of view of the present article, the interest of this work lies in the fact that the authors try to describe the evolutionary history through which communication emerges. In summary, they divide this history into five stages, which can be summarized as follows.
1. At the beginning, both males and females behave randomly. 2. Males who do not move become extinct. 3. Males who only go straight (ignoring signals) take over the population. 4. Females evolve signals that can help males to find them, and, consequently, males evolve the ability to appropriately respond to these signals. 5. Finally, there is a further improvement of the communication system, which helps to optimize mate-finding.
Although the article by Werner and Dyer is quite interesting in that they attempt to give an account of communication phylogeny, their description is vague. For example, regarding the transition between stages (3) and (4), that is, the crucial transition between noncommunicating and communicating organisms, they just say: "Males appeared that turn when in the same row or column as a female. At this point, females had evolved that produce a signal telling the males how to find them" (p. 667). From this passage it appears as if the ability to emit useful signals evolves first, and the ability to respond appropriately to those signals comes later. This would be in line with our hypothesis of communication emerging through a producer bias, rather than a receiver one, as proposed by biologists. However, Werner and Dyer are not very clear on this point, and they do not report a detailed analysis of whether and why this is the case. Hence, from the work of Werner and Dyer, it is not possible to extract general principles about the phylogenetic problem, which we are dealing with here.
Another very interesting study of the phylogeny of communication is that by Quinn (2001) , which explicitly investigates the problem of the co-evolution of speakers and hearers. Using a genetic algorithm, Quinn evolved a team of two simulated robots, which had to move in the environment while remaining close to one another. Robots had only proximity sensors and so had to negotiate how to solve the task by some form of (communicative) interaction, and could not rely on dedicated communication channels. Evolved robots solve their task in a way that can be summarized as follows.
1. Both agents rotate anticlockwise. 2. The agent (agent A), which first faces the other agent (agent B), moves towards it. 3. Agent A remains close to agent B by slightly moving back and forth. 4. As agent B faces agent A, it starts moving backward and is followed by agent A.
The back and forth movements of agent A seem to function as signals for agent B, meaning something like "I am here, waiting for you to start moving." In fact, if an agent perceives the signal while still rotating, it will start moving backward, taking the leading role. In contrast, if an agent perceives the other agent not moving back and forth (i.e., not signaling), it will start signaling, and subsequently it adopts the follower role. Quinn presents an analysis of the evolutionary emergence of such a simple form of communicative interaction. This analysis demonstrates that the back and forth behavior, which functions as a signal, evolved by adapting previously existing behaviors which had other functions, to serve a communicative function. In particular, before assuming its communicative function, the back and forth movement served as an obstacle avoidance behavior, which evolved in order to avoid dangerous collisions between two robots moving one towards the other. This work is particularly important for our purposes in that it demonstrates one way to solve the phylogenetic problem of emitter/ receiver co-evolution: communication might evolve through re-adaptation of non-communicative behaviors to serve a new, communicative function.
Another study that explicitly addresses the evolutionary origins of communication in artificial agents is that of Marocco and Nolfi (2006) . In their work, Marocco and Nolfi evolved a group of four simulated robots for the ability to solve a collective navigation problem. The four robots had to equally distribute themselves between two target areas, two robots in each area. Robots had proximity (infrared) sensors, a ground sensor for detecting target areas, a sensor detecting their own produced signals, and four communication sensors, detecting signals emitted by other robots from four orthogonal directions (front, rear, left, and right). Signals were emitted through a dedicated communication output, with continuous activation, and could be perceived by other robots only from a small distance. Robots evolved using a standard genetic algorithm. The best simulation run produced groups of robots that were able to efficiently solve their task by using five different signals: signal A is emitted by a robot that is looking for a target area and does not detect other signals; signal B is produced by a robot looking for a target area and detecting another robot sending either signal A or B; signal C is produced by a robot located in a target area and not perceiving any other signal; signal D is a "null" signal (i.e., a zero intensity signal, which is produced by a robot located outside a target area that detects a signal C); signal E is produced by two robots that are together inside the same target area. Marocco and Nolfi analyze the evolutionary emergence of the evolved signals, stressing the fact that communication abilities co-evolve with individual (non-communicative) abili-ties. In particular, they focus on how the meanings of signals are grounded not only on robots' simple sensory-motor interactions, but rather on already evolved behavioral capacities. For example, the presence of an ability (behavior) to remain in a target area acts as a prerequisite for the emergence of signal C, which communicates the location of the target areas to other robots. Marocco and Nolfi do not discuss explicitly the phylogenetic problem we are dealing with here, but from their analyses it seems that signaling abilities tend to systematically precede responding abilities. If true, this is particularly interesting here, because it is strictly related to the hypothesis we are advancing in the present article, namely, that communication can evolve as a result of the exploitation, by receivers, of already existing producer biases towards good signaling.
Finally, three previous studies, which focused on the adaptive problem of communication (the problem of altruism), are relevant for the present work, in that they represent its immediate inspiration. In a model very similar to that presented here, Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) were able to evolve a communication system that benefits only hearers in a population of ecological neural networks. Discussing their surprising results, Cangelosi and Parisi suggested that even though in their model there was no advantage for speakers to produce useful signals, communication could evolve thanks to the link between communicative behavior and other "cognitive" abilities. The argument runs as follows. In order to behave adaptively, organisms need to internally categorize experiences in ways that are relevant for their survival. As a consequence, if communicative behavior depends on the internal representation of experience, which is true in the simulations of Cangelosi and Parisi and is assumed to be true also in real organisms, then produced signals will tend to be correlated to adaptively useful categories. As a result, the evolution of good signalers might be explained as a by-product of their independently evolving ability to categorize the environment.
The same idea has been restated by Marocco, Cangelosi, and Nolfi (2003) , who tried to evolve a communication system in a population of neural networks controlling a robot arm whose task was to categorize objects by physically interacting with them. However, in that work, notwithstanding the supposed "cognitive" pressure toward good signal production, the evolution of such a communication system proved to be very difficult. In fact, a good communication system evolved only in 7 out of 10 replications of the simulation, even if (i) the networks were cognitively pre-adapted to solve the task before the introduction of communication, and (ii) the speaker was always the parent of the hearer, so that there was a strong selective pressure for the evolution of communication due to kin-selection.
In a recent article (Mirolli & Parisi, 2005a) , which is the immediate precursor of the present article, we have shown that a communication system that provides benefits only for hearers is not evolutionarily stable, in a model very similar to that used in Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) , unless other factors prevent altruistic signalers being exploited by cheaters. Although we believe that the idea of Cangelosi and Parisi of a cognitive pressure on the production of good signals is sound, our previous results, together with those of Marocco and co-workers, cast doubt on it. Indeed, it seems that the supposed cognitive pressure on the production of good signals cannot be sufficient to explain the evolutionary emergence of an altruistic communication system, for at least two reasons. First, the cognitive pressure can produce an individual tendency to produce good signals, but cannot explain why signals are shared in the population. Second, the emergence of a good communication system does not explain its evolutionary stability; that is why the communicating population is not invaded by mutant individuals that cheat conspecifics by producing misleading signals. The simulations and analyses presented in this article are intended to clarify this topic. In particular, we present detailed analyses of the complex evolutionary dynamics exhibited by our simulations, which will serve to answer the following questions. Does the need for categorizing experience in adaptive ways really constitute a drive towards good individual signaling behavior? What else is needed for good communication to emerge at the level of the population? Can these factors, by themselves, render the communication system evolutionarily stable? To relate these questions to the general problems posed by communication, which we have discussed above, we ask the following questions. Are producer biases towards good signaling possible solutions to the phylogenetic problem of communication? Can they also represent solutions to the adaptive problem posed by altruistic communication systems?
The Model
Our model consists of a population of 100 organisms living in a one-dimensional environment (a corridor, shown in Figure 1a ). An individual's behavior is controlled by a neural network and the individual's fitness is a function of the number of movements the individual makes and the number and type of mushrooms it eats during its life. There are 420 possible mushrooms, each different from all the others in its perceivable properties, encoded as strings of 10 bits in the visual input units of an organism's neural network. Half of the mushrooms are edible, in that they increase the fitness of the individual that eats them, while the other half are poisonous, in that they decrease the individual's fitness. The architecture of the neural network is shown in Figure 1b : it includes 10 visual input units, two communicative input units, two hidden units, one motor output unit, and two communicative output units. The network's connection weights are encoded as real values in the range [-4, 4] in the genome of the organisms. The visual range of our organisms is limited in that the visual input units encode a mushroom's properties only if the organism is in the cell immediately preceding the mushroom cell; otherwise, the organism sees nothing (i.e., the activation of all visual input units is set to 0). The motor output unit of the network has a step activation function, which determines whether the organism moves one step forward (if the activation is 1) or remains still (if the activation is 0). In our model, signals consist in the two-dimensional vectors of the activations (in [-1, 1]) of the communicative output units of an organism (the speaker), which are copied in the communicative input units of another organism (the hearer).
Each individual of each generation lives for 420 trials, one for each mushroom. In each trial, the individual is put in the start cell of the corridor, one of the mushrooms is put at the end of the corridor, and another individual is chosen randomly from the population to act as speaker. The speaker is placed near the mushroom and emits a signal through its communicative output units, which is received by the tested organism (the hearer) through its communicative input units. The trial ends either if the hearer reaches the mushroom and eats it or after 11 input-output cycles. An individual's fitness increases with the number of edible mushrooms eaten and decreases with the number of poisonous mushrooms eaten and the number of move- ments made. More precisely, fitness is calculated according to the following formula ,
( 1 ) where: n e and n p are, respectively, the number of edible and poisonous mushrooms eaten by x; n m is the number of movements made by x; a, b, and c are three constants (set to 30, 5, and 1, respectively); and norm is the normalization factor (maximum possible fitness), which equals 4,200.
After all the individuals of one generation have lived their lives, the next generation is created by selecting individuals with a probability proportional to their fitness (using the roulette wheel method with windowing), 2 making them reproduce sexually (with doublepoint crossover), and mutating the genes (connection weights) of the offspring with a probability of 0.1%.
Simulations run for 2,000 generations, during which we calculate various statistics, the most important being average fitness and what we call "communication system quality." For a communication system to be good, three conditions must apply: (i) objects belonging to the same category must be signaled in similar ways; (ii) objects belonging to different categories must be signaled in different ways; (iii) all individuals must signal in the same way, which implies that the communication system is shared in the population. In our model, signals are two-dimensional vectors, which can be represented as points in a two-dimensional space whose coordinates are the activations of the two communicative output units of speakers. Hence, the communication system of a population consists of two clouds of points: the points that represent the signals emitted by all the organisms in the presence of all edible mushrooms, and the points corresponding to the signals emitted in the presence of all poisonous mushrooms. Condition (i) is satisfied if the two clouds are small (meaning that mushrooms of the same category are signaled in similar ways). Condition (ii) is satisfied if the two clouds are distant from one another (meaning that mushrooms belonging to different categories are signaled in different ways). Condition (iii), which regards the sharedness of the communication system (i.e., the fact that the communication system is shared between the individuals of the population), is implicitly satisfied by the other two conditions, as the clouds represent the communication system of the entire pop-ulation. Our communication system quality is calculated as the average between the two measures that make a communication system good: (i) the mean distance of the points of each cloud from the cloud's geometrical center, and (ii) the distance between the geometrical centers of the two clouds.
Results, With a Possible Explanation
In the scenario of our simulations, the emergence of a good communication system would provide an advantage only to hearers. A hearer who receives good signals could in fact use the received signals for deciding to approach mushrooms signaled as "edible" or to remain still when the received signal stands for "poisonous." This would allow the hearer to avoid wasting its energy by approaching poisonous mushrooms and thus would increase its fitness. For speakers, however, there is no benefit whatsoever in producing good signals. On the contrary, as individuals compete for reproduction, producing good signals is a purely altruistic trait in that, by giving an advantage to competitors, indirectly decreases the reproductive chances of the good signaler. In other words, our simulative scenario poses both the phylogenetic problem and the adaptive problem because of the altruistic character of this type of food call.
The results of 10 out of 50 replications of the simulation, which are representative of all the others, are shown in Figure 2 .
The results are quite surprising: average fitness and communication system quality fluctuate cyclically between very low and very high values. This means that communication continually emerges but it is also continually disrupted. Because this very unstable pattern is present in all the replications of the simulation, the mechanisms that generate it must be very strong and reliable. What might these mechanisms be?
The sudden drops in the communication system quality can be explained by referring to the abovementioned adaptive problem (i.e., as a consequence of the altruistic character of communication). Once a good communication system has emerged in the population, bad speakers are selected against good speakers because they act as cheaters: they can take advantage of the good signals they receive while misleading other organisms by producing bad signals. The result is that bad signalers (cheaters) rapidly invade the population, with the consequence of a sudden decrease in the
quality of the communication system. Why should a good communication system emerge in the first place or re-emerge after being disrupted? Clearly, in our simulation something powerful must be at work, which is able to solve the phylogenetic problem, pushing the communication system towards good quality. We hypothesize that the tendency of communication to emerge is a result of two factors.
The first factor is the "cognitive" pressure suggested by Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) . In order to survive and reproduce, organisms must categorize perceived mushrooms according to their quality, moving forward in the corridor when they perceive edible mushrooms and remaining still when they perceive poisonous mushrooms. To produce this type of behavior, mushrooms must be appropriately categorized in the neural network's hidden units. In other words, in order for an organism to behave efficiently, its network's connection weights must be such that mushrooms belonging to the same category elicit similar activation patterns in the hidden units (similar internal representations), while mushrooms belonging to different categories elicit different internal representations. However, given the architecture of our organisms' neural networks, the signal emitted by an organism in the presence of a mushroom directly depends on the internal representation elicited in the hidden units by the perception of the mushroom. This means that the adaptive pressure to categorize mushrooms appropriately causes, indirectly, a pressure to produce good signals: mushrooms belonging to the same category elicit similar internal representations, which, in turn, tend to elicit similar signals; vice versa, mushrooms belonging to different categories elicit different internal representations which tend to elicit different signals.
However, this cognitive explanation of the spontaneous emergence of a good communication system cannot be enough. The cognitive pressure can, in fact, explain only the fact that each individual tends to produce good signals, that is, signals that systematically co-vary with the category of the mushrooms perceived by the individual. It cannot explain why the communication system is shared in the population (i.e., why different individuals tend to produce similar signals), a condition that is necessary for good communication and that is considered in our measure of the communication system quality. (Remember that the measure is taken at the populational level, considering the signals emitted by all individuals.) In order to explain the sharedness of the communication system, we need to take into consideration another factor: genetic convergence. In fact, if organisms have similar genes (in particular, for the weights connecting the visual input units to the hidden units and the hidden units to the communicative output units), they will have similar (categorical) internal representations and will tend to produce similar signals. Genetic similarity can, in turn, be explained by genetic convergence as a result of selection: only a few individuals, the fittest, reproduce in each generation and, as a consequence, their genes will tend to spread in the population, reducing genetic diversity.
This explanation of our results, if correct, might provide a possible powerful solution to the very general phylogenetic problem of the evolution of commu- nication. However, even though the idea of a possible cognitive pressure toward good signaling has been proposed by several researchers (Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998; Marocco et al., 2003; Mirolli & Parisi, 2005a) , to our knowledge nobody has ever really demonstrated its presence in any model of the evolution of communication, let alone discussed its possible significance for the evolution of real communication systems. The rest of our article is devoted to doing just that: we test our explanation of the peculiar results of our simulation (Sections 4 and 5), and we discuss its relevance for the biological theory on the evolution of communication.
Evolutionary Dynamics of Communication

Zooming in on Evolution
In Section 3 we have given an explanation of the repeated rise and fall of communication in our model based on four factors, as follows:
1. the cognitive pressure toward spontaneous individual good signaling; 2. the genetic pressure toward sharedness of the communication system as a result of the convergence of the population;
3. the direct benefits brought by responding appropriately to informative and shared signals; 4. the pressure against good (shared) signaling produced by the altruistic character of communication.
In order to test this explanation of the complex evolutionary dynamics demonstrated by our simulations, we take a single run of the simulation, select a portion of it (from generation 400 to generation 600), and try to analyze this portion in detail. Figure 3 shows the process of zooming in on the 200 generations we selected.
We have chosen this particular portion of this run for analysis because, looking at the dynamics of average fitness and communication system quality, it seems to clearly exemplify the typical cycle of rise and fall of communication, which repeats itself continually in all the runs. As can be seen from Figure 3 , we have divided the 200 generations into 11 subparts by identifying transitions consisting of significant changes in average fitness and/or communication system quality. These are summarized in Table 1 .
For the sake of clarity, we have grouped some of these subparts together by identifying four macroevolutionary phases, which can be described as follows. The dashed lines of (b) separate macro-evolutionary phases, while the dot-dashed lines subdivide this evolutionary period in the 11 subphases described in Table 1 . See text for details. Phase (a) (generations 400-444): Communication system quality is low and communicative input is ignored, resulting in an average fitness of about 0.55, which is the maximum value that can be reached without the aid of communication. Phase (b) (generations 445-480): Communication system quality improves because of the cognitive and genetic pressures towards good communication. Phase (c) (generations 481-519): Good signaling starts to be exploited and fitness increases until it is near to the maximum value. Phase (d) (generations 520-541): Bad speakers are selected against good ones because they cheat others and invade the population, and the result is a sudden decrease in communication system quality and, consequently, fitness.
Once the communication system quality has reached its minimum, it starts to grow again (phase b1, generations 542-561) until it reaches a very high value, communication restarts to be exploited, and fitness increases again (phase c1, generations 562-600).
Analyses
In order to understand the evolutionary dynamics of these 200 generations of our simulation, we have col-lected a number of statistics and plotted them together in Figure 4 . An evolving population can be considered as a cloud of points in a multidimensional genotype space. In our case, each dimension corresponds to one of the 32 connection weights of an individual's neural network (encoded as real values in the individual's genome). The points correspond to the individuals of the population and each point's coordinates are the values of the individual's genes (connection weights). In order to understand how the population moves in its genetic space, we consider the centroid of the population, that is, the geometrical center of the cloud of points representing the individuals of each generation. In dynamical system terms (Beer, 2000) , the centroid is a dynamical system moving in discrete time (timesteps correspond to generations), in a 32-dimensional continuous space (with each dimension bounded in [-4, 4] ), with a very complex evolution operator (which is implicitly defined by the rules that govern individual life and the selection, reproduction, and mutation operators) and highly stochastic. There is stochasticity in the individuals' interactions and in all the genetic algorithm's operators.
Because the genetic convergence of the population is necessary, according to our hypothesis, for explaining the sharedness of the spontaneously emerging communication system, an interesting sta- Communication is good and partially exploited tistic to take is the genetic variance of our population. However, because our explanation postulates different genetic pressures on different sets of genes, we wanted to determine whether those different genetic pressures would result in different genetic variances. Consequently, we divided our system (the genome of the evolving population) into three subsystems corresponding to the three distinct functional roles that different sets of genes play with respect to communication: the non-communicative genes, the communicativeinput genes, and the communicative-output genes (see Figure 5a ). Genetic variance for each gene (connection weight) x (V x ) is calculated, standardly, according to the formula (2) where N is the number of individuals in the population (i.e., 100), x is the mean value for weight x, and w is the weight x of the ith individual. Consequently, the variances (V k ) for the three categories (k ∈ K) of weights (non-communicative, communicative-input, and communicative-output) are calculated as follows:
(3)
Here, N k is the number of weights of the kth category (i.e., 28, 4, and 4 for non-communicative, communicative-input, and communicative-output weights, respectively), V x is the variance on weight x ∈ k, and norm is the normalization factor, so that V k is in [0, 1] (because weights are bound in [-4, 4] the theoretical maximum variance for each gene is 16, obtained when half of the population has a value of -4 and the other half a value of 4). Figure 4a shows these variances as they change during the 200 generations under analysis. Figure 4b shows the displacement of the centroids of the three functional subsets of genes (noncommunicative, communicative-input, and communicative-output) between generation x and generation x -1. Formally, we plotted the following function (4) where k is the plotted category (non-communicative, communicative-input, and communicative-output), C is the centroid of category k at generation i, and dist (a, b) is the Euclidean distance between points a and b. Figure 4c represents the evolution of the populational communication system itself. As discussed above, as signals are represented by points in the twodimensional space of the communicative-output units of organisms, the communication system can be represented as the two populational centroids of the points that represent the signals emitted in response to edible mushrooms and the signals emitted in response to poisonous mushrooms, respectively. In Figure 4c we have plotted the two coordinates of the two centroids of the signals used for edible and poisonous mushrooms. Figure 4d shows the comparison between four values: the quality of the populational communication system, the average quality of the individuals' communication systems, the quality of the populational representation system, and the average quality of the individuals' representation systems. As discussed above, the communication system quality that we have discussed so far is calculated on the centroids of signals emitted by all the individuals of one generation for all the edible and poisonous mushrooms. However, we can also calculate the quality of the individuals' communication systems. For each individual, we calculate its communication system quality by considering the centroids of the signals emitted by that particular individual. By averaging those quantities over all individuals in a population, we can look at the quality of individual communication systems regardless of the sharedness of communication in the population. Just as the signal emitted by an individual for a given mushroom is the two-dimensional point whose coordinates are the activations of the two communicative output units of that individual for that mushroom, so the internal representation of that individual for that mushroom is the point whose coordinates are the activations of the individual's hidden units when it sees the mushroom. As a consequence, we can calculate both populational and average individual representation quality in the same way as we calculate communication system quality, but considering the points represented by the individuals' internal representations of mushrooms in their hidden units instead of those represented by the signals emitted through the communicative output units.
The last two images of Figure 4 show the evolution of the genes of the best individual of each generation (Figure 4e ) and of the populational centroid (Figure 4f ). The two images are bitmaps, where each point represents in gray scale the value of one of the 32 genes of a given generation (with white corresponding to very low, negative, values and black to very high, positive, values). As usual, genes are grouped according to their functional role (non-communicative, communicative-input, and communicative-output).
Explaining Evolutionary Dynamics
In this section, with the help of the various statistics plotted in Figure 4 , we try to understand the mechanisms that underlie the evolutionary dynamics of our simulation. For reasons of space, we do not describe in detail all that occurs during the 11 evolutionary phases that are summarized in Table 1 , even though this is something that can easily be done. Rather, we focus just on the macro-phases described above, with particular emphasis on those that involve important changes in the communication system quality of the population, that is, phases (b), (d), and (b1) (see Figure 3b) . In particular, we try to answer the following three questions.
How and why does communication improve dur-
ing phase (b)? 2. How and why is communication disrupted during phase (d)? 3. How and why does communication improve again during phase (b1)?
Phase (a)
Even though phase (a) is an evolutionarily stable phase, with respect to both average fitness and communication system quality, we can see that during this phase the populational centroid moves slightly in the non-communicative genetic subspace, while it does not move significantly in the other two subspaces (Figure 4b ). This continuous displacement of the non-communicative centroid is a result of the competition between a few genotypes, which have different non-communicative genes but are phenotypically quite similar in that they provide comparable fitness. This is shown by the fact that during this period some of the non-communicative genes of the best individuals change continually (specifically genes numbers 2, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22; see Figure 4e ), resulting in corresponding changes in the populational centroid (Figure 4f ). The simultaneous presence of competing genotypes during this phase is demonstrated also by the existence of some genetic variance in the non-communicative genes (Figure 4a ). 3
Phase (b)
Phase (b) is characterized by the slow increase in communication system quality at the level of the population. How and why does this happen? During this phase, the activity in the non-communicative genetic space due to the competition between genotypes with equivalent fitness continues, as demonstrated by the graphs of Figures 4a, 4b, 4e and 4f. However, during this competition the best individual of the population starts to have a different communicative-output gene (the first one; see Figure 4e) . As a consequence, the communicative-output populational centroid starts to slowly displace itself (Figure 4b) until the population has converged on the new value of the mutated gene (Figure 4f ). During this phase, signals are ignored because during phase (a) they used to be uninformative; indeed, as shown in Figure 4c , during phase (a) there was almost no signaling at all, in that the centroids of the signals for both edible and poisonous mushrooms have a value of about 0. As a result, there cannot be any selective pressure whatsoever regarding communicative-output genes. In fact, during this phase, average fitness does not change at all (Figure 3) . Hence, the new communicative-output gene spreads in the population just by genetic drift. However, how can simple genetic drift in a single gene produce such an increase in the quality of the communication system of the population? As we can see in Figure 4d , notwithstanding the slight variability in the non-communicative genes, the population has already converged at the level of internal representations: the populational representation quality is in fact very good, almost as good as average individual categorization quality (Figure 4d ). It is just this convergence on categorized and shared representations of mushrooms that makes it possible for the spreading in the population of the new communicative-output gene to bring about a simultaneous increase in both individual and populational communication system quality. In fact, the new communicative-output gene just makes manifest in the communicative-output units (in particular in the first unit; see Figure 4c ) the categorization of mushrooms already present in the hidden units.
Phase (c)
During phase (c) the good signals produced spontaneously by speakers are exploited by receivers, thanks to the appearance of favorable mutations in both the non-communicative and the communicative-input genes. Thanks to the fact that they permit the exploitation of good signals, these mutations generate two sudden increases in average fitness. The first fitness increase occurs at the beginning of phase (c), and is a result of two sudden jumps of the population in the non-communicative and communicative-input genetic subspaces. These jumps are evident in the sudden stabilization of both the best and the centroid non-communicative genes (which produces a sudden decrease in non-communicative genes variance; Figure 4a ), and in the sudden change in the first linguistic-input gene (Figures 4e and 4f) . These sudden changes are also evident in the high peaks of the non-communicative and communicative-input centroids displacement (Figure 4b ). The second increase in average fitness is a result of a further displacement of the non-communicative genes centroid (Figure 4b ).
In turn, this depends on a favorable mutation in the first gene of the best individual, which rapidly spreads to the whole population (Figures 4e and f) .
Phase (d)
At the end of phase (c) all organisms both produce similar, useful signals, and correctly interpret the signals they receive, resulting in very good average fitness (Figure 3b ). How and why is communication disrupted during phase (d)? This is clearly because of the invasion of the population by cheaters. At the very beginning of phase (d), a new mutation occurs in the first communicative-output gene, which makes the mutant individual produce signals that are different from those of all the other organisms in the population. As is clear from Figure 4e , the best individual happens to be one with a new allele for that gene (Figure 4e ). This new allele starts to spread in the population, even though slowly, because individuals that possess this allele cheat the others. When they act as speakers, they produce the signal that is interpreted as meaning "edible" when there is a poisonous mushroom and the signal interpreted as meaning "poisonous" when there is an edi-ble mushroom. As a consequence, hearers are misled and obtain lower fitness. The fact that the new allele makes individuals invert their signals, and does not simply make individuals produce signals that do not distinguish between edible and poisonous mushroom is demonstrated by the fact that while during phase (d) populational communication system quality decreases, average individuals communication system quality slightly increases (Figure 4d ). This means that organisms with the new alleles in the first communicativeoutput gene produce, individually, even better signals than those with the old alleles, but the new signals have opposite meanings with respect to the old signals. When the new allele has spread in half of the population, the communication system quality of the population has reached its minimum, because half of the organisms signal "edible" with a high value in the first communicative-output unit and "poisonous" with a low value in the same unit, as in the preceding generations, while the other half, with the new allele, do the opposite, signaling "edible" with a low value in the first communicative-output unit and "poisonous" with a low value. This explains why at generation 540 the mean value of the first communicative-output unit is 0 for signals emitted for both edible and poisonous mushrooms (Figure 4c ), while individual communication system quality is quite high (Figure 4d ). The presence of two opposite alleles in the population of the first communicative-output gene also explains the peak in the genetic variance of the communicativeoutput genes (Figure 4a ). Now there is high variance not only in the last communicative-output gene but also in the first, which produces a variance that is about twice as great as that of the preceding generations. Finally, the simultaneous presence of the two alleles is also manifest in the fact that while the first communicative-output gene of the populational centroid (Figure 4f) changes between a very low value (dark gray) to the mean value (0, represented by medium gray) to a very high value (bright gray), the best individuals have always either the dark allele or the bright allele (Figure 4e ). This means that the change in the populational centroid is a result of a change in the proportion of the two competing alleles in the population.
Phase (b1)
How and why does communication quality increases again during phase (b1)? Phase b1 is just a continuation of phase (d). The population continues to move in the communicative-output space (Figure 4b ) towards convergence on the new allele for the first communicative-output gene (Figure 4a ) because this gene continues to provide a relative selective advantage due to cheating. As a result, populational communication system quality starts to increase again (Figure 4d) , as the population converges to the new signaling behavior: low values in the first communicative-output unit for "edible" and high values for "poisonous" (Figure 4c ). The reason why average fitness continues to decrease during this phase while communication system quality increases (Figure 3b) is the same that explains the convergence of the population to the new allele for the first communicative-output gene. Even though the new communicative-output gene makes speakers produce good signals, these signals are misinterpreted by hearers, which have communicative-input genes adapted to the previous communication system, which was just the opposite to the new communication system. As a result, average fitness remains at its minimum value for a few generations.
Phase (c1)
Finally, at the beginning of phase (c1) a series of mutations occur that allow the population to re-adapt to the new communication system. Chronologically, changes in the fourth, second, and first communicative input genes and in the last noncommunicative gene of the best individuals (Figure 4e ) are rapidly followed by analogous changes in the populational centroid (Figure 4f ). As a consequence, the population rapidly displaces itself in both the communicative-input and non-communicative subspaces (Figure 4b) . At generation 580, the population has converged in both the communicative-input and non-communicative genetic spaces (Figure 4a ), good signals are partially exploited, and nothing relevant occurs any more.
In conclusion, we can say that the analysis of the dynamics of the population during the 200 generations we have taken into consideration has clearly confirmed the overall interpretation of the continuous rise and fall in both communication system quality and average fitness that we have provided in Section 3. However, this is not enough. Even if our analysis has been demonstrated to be correct for the evolutionary period we have studied, we still cannot be sure that the same is true for all the periods of all the replications of the same simulation. In other words, the analysis of a single run is not enough for the extrapolation of gen-eral principles. In order to test whether the tendency towards the emergence of communication due to cognitive and genetic pressures is general rather than relative to a single run of the simulation, we compare the average results of 50 runs of the simulation discussed so far (which from now on we call the base-line simulation) with those of two new control conditions, which we call the no-cognitive-pressure and the nocommunication simulations. This is done in the next section.
Control Experiments
No-Communication and No-Cognitive-Pressure Simulations
The no-cognitive-pressure simulation runs exactly as the base-line simulation but organisms have neural networks with a different architecture, as shown in Figure 5b .
The difference is that in this condition there are two groups of hidden units (composed of two neurons each): one receives connections from both the visual and the communicative input units and sends connections to the motor output units, the other receives connections from the visual input units and sends connections to the communicative output units. In this way, we artificially avoid any impact of categorization on communicative behavior: because the communicative output does not depend on the same neurons on which the motor output depends, with the new architecture there cannot be any cognitive pressure towards good signal production. 4 Organisms of the no-communication simulation have the same neural network as those of the base-line simulation (Figure 5a ) but in this case communication is not allowed. In other words, in the no-communication simulation organisms cannot send signals and, consequently, tested individuals never receive any communicative input. Under such conditions, the only way for an individual to behave correctly is to move towards the mushroom until the mushroom is close enough to be clearly perceived and then to decide whether to eat the mushroom or to refrain from doing so. As a consequence, the maximum fitness that can be obtained by the individuals of the no-communication simulation is 0.55. The reason is that these organisms must always pay the cost of moving towards mushrooms. This cost can be avoided, when the mush-room happens to be poisonous, by organisms that receive reliable signals (in the simulations with communication). Note that the communicative weights (those that link the communicative input and output units with the hidden units) are never used in this simulation, so they are adaptively neutral and subject to genetic drift. Nonetheless, we can still test what signals are produced by the networks located near to a mushroom and, consequently, measure the communication system quality of the no-communication simulation even if signals are never used. Figure 6 shows the results of the three simulations (base-line, no-communication, and no-cognitive-pressure) in terms of communication system quality (a) and average fitness (b).
Results
The results (averaged over 50 replications of each simulation) clearly support our hypothesis regarding the cognitive pressure towards the emergence of a good communication system. The communication system quality in the no-communication simulation is quite high (about 0.5; see Figure 6a ), being not much lower than the value reached in a "kin-selection" sim- ulation (about 0.6), which was good enough to allow the population to reach almost maximum fitness (the kin-selection simulation and its results are reported in Mirolli & Parisi, 2005b) . This means that the need to categorize mushrooms and the genetic convergence of the population are sufficient to produce a good communication system even in populations in which communication is not allowed and the communicativeoutput weights are subject to genetic drift. Furthermore, the fact that the quality of the communication system in the no-communication condition is considerably higher than in the base-line condition (about 0.35) means that, if signals are used, there is a direct selective pressure against good speaking, because of the altruistic character of communication.
The results of the no-cognitive-pressure simulation confirm our analysis. If we prevent any influence of cognition on signal production by manipulating the architecture of the neural network, a good communication system never emerges, resulting in an average communication system quality of about 0.2, which is considerably lower than that of the base-line condition.
The results in terms of average fitness (Figure 6b ) are quite clear. In both the no-communication and nocognitive-pressure simulations, fitness reaches the maximum value achievable without communication;
in the first case because communication is not allowed, in the second case because signals are useless and cannot be exploited. Because the organisms of the baseline simulation can sometimes take advantage of communication, their average fitness is a little (but not much) higher.
In Figure 7a we have plotted the variances of noncommunicative and communicative-output connection weights of the base-line simulation (as usual, we show the average results of 50 replications).
There is indeed a considerable genetic convergence as both variances are very low, which explains the sharedness of the spontaneously emerging communication system, but the communicative-output weights have a much higher variance (about 0.1) than the non-communicative weights (about 0.01). The explanation is to be found in the selective pressure against good signal production because of the altruistic character of communication. As we have seen in the previous section, the cheaters that invade the population when the communication system is good are those organisms which, due to mutations, have communicative-output weights that are different from those on which the population has converged and which, consequently, let them produce misleading signals. In other words, the variance of the communicative-output weights is higher than the variance of the non- communicative weights because each time the population has genetically converged and the quality of communication is high, there is a strong and reliable pressure to possess communicative-output genes that differ from those of the population, in order to cheat competitors.
This analysis is further confirmed by the comparison between the variances on the communicative-output genes in the three conditions: base-line, nocommunication, and no-cognitive-pressures (Figure 7b ). The three different values reflect the different pressures on those genes in the three conditions. In the nocognitive-pressure simulation, because there is no spontaneous tendency, in individuals, to produce a good communication system, the low variance of communicative-output weights (about 0.03) is explained by the genetic convergence of the population. The fact that the variance of communicative-output weights in the no-communication condition is higher (about 0.06) and tends to grow after reaching its minimum is because in that simulation there is no pressure whatsoever on the communicative-output genes, so they are subject to genetic drift (while in the no-cognitivepressure simulation there is some mild pressure to generate bad signals). Nonetheless, the variance of the communicative-output genes is still higher in the base-line simulation than in the no-communication simulation. This confirms our hypothesis that when communication is used there is a reliable selective pressure against good speakers, resulting in a pressure against the genetic convergence on the communicative-output weights: mutations on those genes that generate cheaters are rewarded by selection and spread in the population.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss our work with respect to both computational models of the emergence of communication (Section 6.1) and the biological literature on the evolution of communication (Section 6.2).
Synthetic Modeling of the Emergence of Communication
The work presented in this article clearly demonstrates the soundness of the hypothesis that the emergence of communication can be favored by a cognitive pressure towards spontaneous good signaling. Indeed, we have shown that the need to categorize stimuli in adaptive ways can act as a powerful cognitive pressure to individually produce good signals, while the sharedness of the communication system between different individuals of the same population can be favored by the genetic convergence of the population itself. These two factors, taken together, generate a "producer bias," which can represent an important factor for the solution of the phylogenetic problem of communication. However, can this producer bias, by itself, solve also the adaptive problem of communication? In our simulations, the emerged communication system is continually disrupted by the invasion of the population by cheaters, but in the simulations reported by Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) the cognitive and genetic pressures were enough for communication to both evolve and remain stable. What is the explanation for this difference? From our analysis, it seems clear that the cognitive pressure cannot be sufficient, by itself, for the evolutionary stability of a communication system that gives benefits only to one of the two actors of a communicative interaction (in our case the hearer). The reason is that a population of altruistically communicating individuals is always at risk of being invaded by cheating individuals who benefit from the received signals but do not reciprocate (or lie, thus misleading competing individuals), unless some other factor prevents this from happening. In Mirolli and Parisi (2005a) we have shown three possible factors that can block the invasion of cheaters in a communicating population: kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) , the social learning of the communication system through docility (Simon, 1990) , and the use of signals not only for communication but also for individual purposes (see also Mirolli & Parisi, 2006) such as memory aids. Other possible factors are sexual selection through the handicap principle (Bullock, 1998; Grafen, 1990; Zahavi, 1975) and reciprocal altruism (Axelrod, 1981; Trivers, 1971) . Why, then, does the communication system in the simulations of Cangelosi and Parisi turn out to be evolutionarily stable even though none of the factors discussed above is present?
A possible answer lies in the genetic algorithm used by Cangelosi and Parisi, in particular in their peculiar mutation operator. As in the present work, in Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) the neural networks' connection weights are codified in the genome of organ-isms as real values. However, in their simulations weights are initialized in the range [-1, 1] and each weight has a probability of 10% of being mutated by adding to the current value a random number in [-1, 1] . As a result, weights have no limits. This peculiar way of implementing the mutation operator might prevent the invasion of cheaters for the following reason. As demonstrated by our analysis of evolutionary dynamics, during the periods in which the communication system quality is low, received signals are ignored. Consequently, communicative-output connection weights are under genetic drift, in that they do not affect the fitness of any organism: neither that of the speakers, which is never influenced by its own produced signals, nor that of the hearers, as hearers ignore incoming signals. However, a genetic drift without any limits on the connection weights is likely to produce weights of very high absolute values. Also, a mutation that changes a weight's value by adding a random number in the interval [-1, 1] will tend to be behaviorally uninfluential for weights with very high absolute values. This is especially true for the signaling behavior of the organisms simulated in Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) , as the transmission function of "linguistic" neurons in that simulation is the step function, whose value can be changed only by changing the sign of the input received by the neurons. The consequence is that once a good communication system has emerged as a result of cognitive and genetic pressures, cheaters cannot emerge because mutations on the communicative-output connection weights are completely neutral in that they cannot affect signaling behavior.
In contrast, in our simulations, mutations can change radically the value of connection weights (the mutated value is substituted by a random value always in the same range), so cheaters can emerge when a mutation to one of the communicative-output connection weights changes the signaling behavior of an organism. The same is true for the robotic experiment of Marocco et al. (2003) , in which connection weights are coded as strings of 8 bits and mutations act on each bit. In this way, all the bits coding for a single weight can change simultaneously and, in general, a mutation in one single bit (e.g., in the bit coding for the weight's sign) can have a radical effect on the value of the weight and, consequently, on communicative behavior. In fact, the cognitive pressure towards good signaling is not sufficient for the emergence of communication in their robots.
The mutation operator used by Cangelosi and Parisi has two fundamental problems, one theoretical and one practical. Theoretically, it seems not to be biologically plausible. In real organisms, mutations can occur in many different ways (see Maki, 2002) and they can always have any kind of effect on the mutating gene: from no effect to the substitution of the codified protein. Hence, there seems to be no biological analogy to the mechanism, present in the simulations of Cangelosi and Parisi, which prevents a gene that has been subject to genetic drift from having nonneutral mutations. This may sound like a poor argument because, in a sense, any mutation method used in current genetic algorithms (including the one used in the simulations of the present article) can be considered to be biologically implausible. The reason is that the genotype-phenotype mappings are typically highly biologically unrealistic (as is the case for the current work, in which the genotype is constituted by connection weights that are directly mapped to an individual's phenotype). However, in addition to the general problem of working on unrealistic genotypes, the mutation operator used by Cangelosi and Parisi has the further specific problem of tending to prevent the occurrence of non-neutral mutations in genes that have been subject to genetic drift. This can have important consequences on a population's evolutionary dynamics, which can, in turn, produce misleading results. Pragmatically, the reason for not adopting the type of mutation operator used in Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) is that it is too easily subject to falling in local maxima. In general, during a genetic search, some parts of the genome tend to evolve early and other parts later (either because some part of the genome codes for a trait that is a precondition for the evolution of the trait coded from other parts or simply because of chance). With a mutation system such as the one we are discussing, the genetic drift of the genes that are not functional during a given evolutionary phase can prevent the subsequent adaptive evolution of those genes just because they have reached absolute values that are too high with respect to the range on which mutations act. Consequently, this type of mutation operator can seriously compromise the evolutionary process.
Another take-home message for modelers who are interested in the emergence of communication in artificial agents (be they simulated or real robots) regards the importance of studying the evolution of communication together with the evolution of other, non-communicative behaviors. This is something which several other researchers have already been arguing for (e.g., Nolfi, 2005; Quinn, 2001; Werner & Dyer, 1992) . The usual argument, to which we completely subscribe, stems from taking a functional perspective: communication is an adaptive trait, which is shaped by its function. Hence, communication can only be understood if it is grounded in the environmental and social needs of communicating organisms. However, our work suggests another, practical, reason for making communication emerge from the needs posed by other non-communicative tasks. The reason is that the need for internally categorized experiences in adaptive ways for purposes other than communication can play a major role in solving the phylogenetic problem of communication. As our no-cognitive pressure simulations demonstrate, if the evolution of producer biases towards communication is not allowed, it is much more difficult to evolve a communication system in artificial organisms. This is true even for cases in which communication would be very useful and the adaptive problems posed by some communication systems are not present or solved by other factors, such as kin selection. If the only thing that agents have to do is to communicate, the presence of producer biases is prevented.
Furthermore, the favorable effect that having to represent one's environment in adaptive ways can have on the emergence of communication can show up only if the control systems of agents permit this to occur. This is the case for neural networks but not for other types of control system used in the adaptive behavior literature on the evolution of communication, such as look-up tables (e.g., Di Paolo, 1998; Mac-Lennan & Burghardt, 1993; Steels, 1996) . Neural networks, as the control systems of real organisms (i.e., brains), process information in a parallel and distributed way, and the same processing units are involved when perceiving different situations and for producing different behaviors. It is the link between communicative and non-communicative behavior which tends to result in producer biases towards communication. If the control system of an artificial agent is a look-up table, in which the relationships between each possible perception and each possible action are completely independent the ones from the others, the emergence of a producer bias would be very unlikely, and only due to chance. In contrast, neural networks make the interdependences between different behaviors explicit, thus providing a systematic mechanism for the emergence of producer biases.
This implies two different views of "modules" in control systems. In a neural network, and very likely in the brain itself, modules are purely functional but structurally they can include and use subsets of units (neurons) that are also included in and used by other modules with different functions. However, in nonneural computational models, such as look-up tables, modules are both functionally and structurally distinct entities. If cognitive pressures and producer biases really exist and have an important role in explaining the evolutionary emergence of communication, neural models appear to be more appropriate than non-neural models to capture the evolutionary emergence of communication.
Evolution of Communication
As discussed in the introduction, the fact that communication requires two independent capabilities, speaking (producing useful signals) and hearing (understanding perceived signals), poses two related problems: an adaptive problem and a phylogenetic problem. The adaptive problem is a problem of altruism: why should speakers produce good signals if they gain no benefit in doing so? Conversely, why should hearers respond adequately to signals if they do not receive any advantage from this? Notwithstanding the emphasis of the biological literature on manipulative communication, the situation seems to be completely symmetrical, both theoretically and empirically. Also, the existence of natural communication systems that seem not to benefit both speakers and hearers needs to be explained by kin selection or by the handicap principle or by some other means.
Besides the adaptive problem, there is the more general phylogenetic problem: what evolutionary paths can lead to the emergence of communication systems, as speaking and hearing abilities are complementary and hence adaptively neutral if they are not both present at the same time? The biological literature has provided a partial answer to this question with the concept of a receiver (or sensory) bias. If some stimuli trigger in some organism a behavioral response that benefits another organism, the latter can produce signals that resemble those stimuli in order to manipulate the behavior of the former. In this way, the problem of co-evolution is bypassed through the exploitation of behavioral biases in the receivers, which are assumed to be present for reasons other than communication. There are several reasons for receiver biases to be present. In particular, they can be both the results of selective processes independent from communication (e.g., detection of prey) and non-selected, incidental traits, which are simply consequences of how the sensory systems and the brain of a species are formed (see Endler & Basolo, 1998; Guilford & Dawkins, 1991) . Since its introduction in the biological literature on the evolution of communication, the concept of a receiver bias has inspired much of both empirical (e.g., Basolo, 1995; Proctor, 1992; Ryan, Fox, Wilczynski, & Rand, 1990) and theoretical/computational research (e.g., Arak & Enquist, 1995; Ryan, Phelps, & Rand, 2001) .
In the present article, we have argued for the complementary idea of the exploitation of a producer bias, which has so far been highly overlooked in the biological literature on the evolution of communication. In fact, although ideas similar to that of producer bias have appeared in the literature under the label of "intention movements" (i.e., movements necessarily preceding an action; see, for example, Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Tinbergen, 1952) , these ideas have not received enough theoretical attention and have not inspired any substantial empirical research. The reason for this is, we suppose, twofold. First, as discussed in the introduction, the idea of producer biases is fundamentally related to informative communication, while the influential conception of communication of Dawkins and Krebs has led the biological literature to focus on manipulative communication. Second, ideas similar to the producer bias have mostly been discussed in relation to the adaptive problem of communication (in particular in relation to the handicap principle; see, for example, Lotem, Wagner, & Balshine-Earn, 1999; Noble, 1998) , while they have never been explicitly and clearly proposed as a possible general solution to the phylogenetic problem of communication.
We argue that just as the exploitation of receiver biases is an important mechanism, which can trigger the evolution of manipulative communication systems, the exploitation of producer biases can play an analogous role in the historical emergence of communication systems that (principally) benefit hearers, such as alarm and food calls. Furthermore, the simulations presented in this article also suggest one possible mechanism that can lead to producer biases: cognitive pressure as a result of the need for organisms to internally represent stimuli according to adaptively relevant categories. In fact, as our simulations have shown, good categorization of stimuli can result in the spontaneous production of good signals, which can be thus be exploited by hearers.
However, is the hypothesis of a cognitive pressure towards good signaling behavior plausible? Does it hold only for our simulations and related artificial systems? Or is it also a possible candidate for explaining the evolutionary emergence of real communication systems? We think that the hypothesis is indeed plausible and that it should be taken into consideration when trying to explain the evolutionary emergence of animal communication systems, in particular those that seem to benefit principally receivers. After all, the only assumption that needs to be made for our hypothesis to work is the link, in the organisms' brains, between communicative and non-communicative behaviors. In fact, if such a link exists, then the need for individuals to categorize the environment in adaptive ways will generate a bias towards the production of useful signals. This assumption seems quite reasonable: what should signals reflect if not what organisms have in their minds/brains? Note that, notwithstanding our use of a representationalist jargon, the hypothesis of possible cognitive pressures towards good signaling does not depend on taking a representationalist stance in the representationalists versus dynamicists debate. Even the most radical enthusiast of the dynamical approach to cognition and the most critical or skeptical on the use of the notion of representation for explaining adaptive behavior (Beer, 2003; Brooks, 1991; Harvey, 1996) acknowledges that an organism's behavior depends also on internal (neural) dynamics. Hence, the same single assumption is needed, from a dynamical systems point of view, for accepting the possibility of a cognitive pressure toward good signaling, that is, the assumption that signaling behavior is internally linked to the brain structures that also govern other non-communicative behaviors. In fact, for an organism's behavior to be adaptive, different adaptive conditions will be correlated with different internal dynamics, which in turn will tend to be reflected in different signaling behavior. This is exactly what the hypothesis on a cognitive pressure towards good signaling states: that produced signals will tend to spontaneously reflect adaptively relevant situations because of the need for organisms to cope adaptively with their environment.
Our hypothesis is also empirically testable. One way to test it is the following. Take an animal capable of sending signals. Train it to send a signal in at least two situations that differ from the point of view of the animal's survival (in the presence of edible versus poisonous items, as in our simulation, or asking for two significantly different types of things, such as food versus a partner for mating). Our hypothesis of the cognitive pressure on good signaling predicts that the animal will tend to spontaneously differentiate between the signals emitted in the two different situations.
It is of the most importance that a first confirmation of this prediction can indeed already be found in recent empirical experiments on Japanese monkeys performed by Hihara, Yamada, Iriki, and Okanoya (2003) . In these experiments, a monkey was trained to produce a generic call in two different conditions: (i) for receiving food and (ii) for receiving a tool with which it could reach a distant food. Surprisingly, without any reward for doing so, the trained monkey started to spontaneously differentiate the sounds emitted in the two conditions. The authors of the experiments interpret their striking finding as the result of a change, in the monkey, from emotional to intentional vocalizations. However, the spontaneous differentiation of the monkey's calls can be explained, less speculatively, by the simple fact that in the two conditions the monkey's brain was in two different states: one corresponding to the need for a piece of food and the other corresponding to the need for a tool with which to reach the food. As predicted by our hypothesis, different internal states, be they "conscious" (as Hihara et al. suggest), "intentional" or "emotional," tend to produce different (communicative) behaviors. In brief, what you have in mind will influence what you say. The signals an organism produces will tend to reflect the way in which the organism categorizes its experience.
Finally, we would like to note that the hypothesis that communication might phylogenetically emerge thanks to the exploitation of producer biases is far more general than the hypothesis of a cognitive pressure toward spontaneous good signaling. In fact, although we think that the need to adaptively categorize the environment does constitute a strong mechanism for producer biases to appear, there is no reason for pro-ducer biases to have exclusively cognitive origins. On the contrary, there are good reasons to suppose that other, non-cognitive, mechanisms can equally generate producer biases. Indeed, it is reasonable to think that most emotional communication might have evolved thanks to producer biases. Because emotional states are associated with specific internal bodily changes (e.g., changes in heart rate, blood pressure, etc.), the visible consequences of these changes can be exploited by "receivers" to infer the emotional state of the "producer," thus resulting in the evolution of an emotional communication signal through a non-cognitive producer bias.
Summary and Conclusion
In this article we have presented a simple model which was intended to shed some light on an important and very general problem posed by the evolution of communication, that is, the phylogenetic problem posed by the apparent necessity of the simultaneous co-evolution of both good signal production and good signal understanding, which seem to be two completely independent abilities. Our evolutionary model demonstrated an unusual behavior: a sort of limit cycle, present in all the replications of our simulations, in which both individuals' fitness and the quality of the communication system continually oscillate between very low and very high values. In order to understand the mechanisms that produce this striking result, we used two methods. First, we isolated a typical cycle of rise and fall of communication which takes place in one replication of the simulation and we analyzed the evolutionary dynamics during this period. Second, we compared the average results of the baseline simulation with two other simulations in which we disabled communication (no-communication simulation) or we changed the neural networks that control the behavior of our artificial organisms in such a way that cognition was entirely separated from communication (no-cognitive-pressure simulation). The results of our analyses suggest a possible general solution to the phylogenetic problem of communication. There is the possibility for communication systems to emerge thanks to the exploitation, by receivers, of producer biases, which are a result of the need for organisms to categorize perceived stimuli in adaptively relevant ways. We think that the idea of pro-ducer biases is both sound and largely unexplored in the biological literature on the evolution of communication, and might represent an important addition to the complementary very well-known idea of receiver bias. Indeed, just as the idea of the exploitation of receiver biases has proven to be quite powerful in explaining the evolutionary emergence of manipulative communication systems (such as mating signals sent by males to attract females), we think that the idea of the exploitation of producer biases is likely to play an analogous role in explaining the evolutionary emergence of informative signals, such as the alarm and food calls used by many species.
